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THE AMERICANS WITH "CERT AJN" DISABILITIES ACT: 
TITLE I OF THE ADA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S RESULT 
ORIENTED JURISPRUDENCE 
FRANK S. RA VITCH' 
MARSHA B. FREEMAN" 
INTRODUCTION 
Michele recently began working as a certified public accountant for 
a large accounting firm. She is epileptic, but fortunately she found a 
medication that controls her seizures exceptionally well. Consequently, 
she has remained seizure free for nearly ten years. While such medica-
tions sometimes cause serious side effects, she has experienced none 
beyond drowsiness in the morning. However, her doctor has told her that 
certain types of flickering lights can cause a seizure, particularly fluores-
cent lights. Unfortunately, the light bulbs in her office emit such a 
flicker, and she is concerned that she may therefore experience a seizure. 
Michele asked her employer to replace the bulbs with a different type of 
bulb that would reduce the risk of seizure, but would cost approximately 
seventy-five dollars more per year. Her employer refused, and as a result 
of her request-which had the effect of informing her employer of her 
epilepsy-Michele was turned down for a high profile assignment for 
which she was well qualified, in favor of a less qualified colleague. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University of Orlando School of Law. Fulbright 
Scholar, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University (Spring/Summer 2001). I would like to thank Charles 
Abernathy for his helpful suggestions regarding this article, and Lawrence O. Gostin for years ago 
sparking my interest in disability law. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University of Orlando School of Law. 
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Under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"),I Michele 
would seemingly be entitled to the minimal accommodation she sought 
and be protected from the discrimination she suffered. In fact-prior to 
the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,2 
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,3 and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirking-
burl-all three agencies charged with implementing the ADA, and most 
of the courts that had addressed the issue of whether someone like Mich-
ele is covered by the Act,considered this threshold question a straight-
forward one:5 she would have been covered. Of course, that would only 
be the beginning of the inquiry for she would still have to meet the other 
provisions of the ADA to win her claim.6 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the Supreme Court's 
recent decisions effectively preclude many individuals with impairments 
that substantially limit a major life activity from coverage under the 
ADA if their disabilities are controlled by mitigating measures such as 
medications.7 Therefore, because Michele's medication has kept her sei-
zure free for years, and she suffers no serious side effects from her medi-
cation, it is now possible the ADA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
does not cover her.8 Thus, her employer need not accommodate her by 
replacing the light bulbs, until of course, the current bulbs cause her to 
have a seizure; at which point, Michele would likely be considered dis-
abled under the Court's recent decisions and covered under the Act. If, 
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994). In determining 
whether a plaintiff is covered under the ADA, the first issue is whether the individual has a 
"disability," which is defined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being 
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.c. § 12102(2). If this threshold question is 
answered affInnatively, a court next considers whether the plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a 
disability." See infra note 6. 
2. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). 
3. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999). 
4. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). 
5. See infra notes 16 & 19 and accompanying text. 
6. In the employment context the ADA prohibits discrimination against any "qualified 
individual with a disability." /d. § 12112(a). After proving that she is disabled under the Act, a 
claimant must also show that she is a "qualified individual" in that she can "with or without 
reasonable accommodation ... perform the essential functions of the employment position [she] 
holds or desires." ld. § 12111 (8). The claimant must prove that the employer acted "because of' the 
disability.ld. § 12112(a). The employer has several defenses available. See id. at § 12113. Assuming 
Michelle can perform the essential functions of her job, the accommodation of replacing the light 
bulbs in her office would appear reasonable. 
7. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137; Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 
2168-69; See infra notes 153-159 and accompanying text (discussing whether a person should be 
determined "disabled" in their medicated or unmedicated state). In Sutton, Justice O'Connor 
suggests thal a well-controlled diabetic would not be covered under the Act'-a scenario very similar 
to Michelle's well-controlled epilepsy. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. 
8. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). Bragdon might 
provide the basis for an argument that Michelle is disabled for ADA purposes, but language from 
Sutton is problematic in this regard. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47. 
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under the Supreme Court's interpretation, she is not currently disabled, 
her employer could discriminate against her in regard to promotions and 
other benefits of employment because she is epileptic unless she can 
prove she was "regarded as,,9 disabled; a task also complicated by the 
Court's decisions in Sutton and Murphy.'o 
This is an odd result, as a primary motivating force underlying the 
employment provisions in Title I of the ADA was the prevention of em-
ployment discrimination based on unfounded stereotypes of disabilities 
and disabled individuals." Yet, the ADA's definition of disability under 
the Court's approach does not necessarily cover individuals with well-
controlled epilepsy, asthma, diabetes, or other conditions that are treat-
able with medication. This issue is further compounded by aspects of the 
Court's approach that may make it harder for some individuals to be 
covered under the ADA's provision protecting those "regarded as" hav-
ing a disability." 
By removing individuals from the ADA's coverage in answering the 
threshold question of whether they are disabled, the Court denies them 
ADA protection entirely, thus denying them the opportunity to receive 
accommodation and even to obtain redress when they are victims of in-
tentional discrimination based on their condition. Even if an accommo-
dation would help avoid problems related to the condition, as in Mich-
ele's case, if those problems have not yet occurred and the individual is 
otherwise well-controlled by medication, prosthetics, etc., that individual 
is not disabled under the Court's analysis, and thus can not get to the 
issue of reasonable accommodation under the Act.'> And, as the Court 
also made it less likely that such individuals will meet the "regarded as" 
having a disability standard, even an employer's use of broad-based 
stereotypes may not be availing to such individuals. 14 This "one-two 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). A person is "regarded as" having a disability if "(I) a covered 
entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting 
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities." Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50. 
Essentially, the covered entity imposes its misperceptions onto the individual. See id. 
10. See infra Parts LA. & LB. (analyzing the Court's decisions in Sutton and Murphy). 
I I. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7); see generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans With 
Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 415-40 (1991) (outlining the origins of the ADA). 
12. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2 I 49-52 (holding that in order to prove that they were regarded as 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, plaintiffs needed to show that they were 
regarded as unable to work in a broad class of jobs); Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137-39 (finding that 
plaintiff "has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs" and thus that he 
had not established that he is "regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working." 
Id. at 2139). 
13. See Sutton, I 19 S. Ct. at 2 146-47. Of course, if the medication only partially controlled the 
effects of the disability or has side effects, and as a result the individual still has an impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity, that individual would be covered under the Court's 
approach. See id. at 2 I 49. 
14. See infra Part ILB. (discussing the "regarded as" provision under the ADA). 
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punch" effectively removes many employees with disabilities from cov-
erage under the ADA, and may actually protect employers who discrimi-
nate based on unfounded stereotypes, misconceptions, Or outright ani-
mus. IS 
All of this might be legally plausible if the text of the ADA, agency 
interpretations, legislative history, or ordinary methods of statutory con-
struction supported it. Strikingly-while the Court argues that the text is 
clear on the subject-the interpretations of all three agencies charged 
with implementing the ADA,16 and the seemingly clear intent of Con-
gress embodied in the legislative history,17 are diametrically opposed to 
the Court's allegedly obvious interpretation. 18 In addition, most of the 
courts that have interpreted the ADA on this issue,19 and the dissenting 
IS. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
16. See 29 c.F.R. pI. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1999) (Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission stating that "[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a 
major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures .... "); 
28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A § 35.104 (1999) (Department of Justice stating that "[t]he question of 
whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating 
measures .... "); 49 c.F.R. § 37.3 (1999) (Department of Transportation: a disability is "a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an 
individual .... "). 
17. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(TI), at 52 (l990), reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334 
(stating "[ w ]hether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of 
mitigating measures .... "); H.R. REP. No. 101-485(I1I), at 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450-51 (stating "[t]he impairment should be assessed without considering 
whether mitigating measures ... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation."); S. REP. No. 
101-116, at 23 (1989) (stating "whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard 
to the availability of mitigating measures .... "). See also Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
18. In fact, the agency interpretations and legislative history mandate an approach opposite to 
that of the Court in regard to the analysis of mitigating measures in disability determinations. See 
supra notes 16-17. 
19. See Taylor v. Path mark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a 
determination of disabilities is made by evaluating the effect a person's impairment has on a major 
life activity without considering mitigating measures); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law 
Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2388 
(1999) (holding that disabilities must be determined without considering mitigating measures); 
Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464,470-71 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
serious impairments should be considered in unmitigated state), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 
119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(evaluating a condition without regard to the effects of mitigating measures); Arnold v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (lst Cir. 1998) (concluding that plaintiffs diabetes should 
be considered without regard to whether his limitations were ameliorated through medication or 
other treatment); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 
1997) (using the ADA and legislative history to support the decision to avoid considering mitigating 
measures when assessing disability); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 762-65 (6th Cir. 
1997) (citing to the EEOC as a basis for deciding that mitigating measures will not be used for 
disability determinations); Doane v. Omaha, lIS F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
mitigating effects will not be considered when determining disability); Harris v. H & W Contracting 
Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11 th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use of mitigating measures shall be 
considered on a case-by-case basis); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) 
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Justices on the Supreme Court,20 did not interpret it in the way that the 
Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg majorities did. A significant aspect of 
this disparity may lie in the Court's presumption that there is an inherent 
conflict between applying the individualized approach mandated by the 
ADA and making disability determinations without regard to mitigating 
measures.
21 This presumption by the Court is directly contradicted by the 
interpretations of the agencies charged with implementing the Act and 
the clear intent of Congress.22 Finally, as will be discussed in greater de-
tail below, in interpreting the Act this way the Court strays from several 
generally accepted methods of statutory construction for civil rights stat-
utes, and may create confusion regarding deference to agency interpreta-
tions.23 
The Court's approach seems to focus on supporting a particular re-
sult, especially given the factually appealing scenarios the Court chose to 
hear. Unfortunately, the holdings, aside from perhaps Kirkingburg, are 
quite broad and could apply to many situations where the facts are not as 
appealing.24 This Article will focus on the trio of cases, and some of the 
concerns they raise under the ADA and in regard to judicial interpreta-
tion. It is essential to note that this Article is not an exhaustive discussion 
of the ADA, its history, or its social context. Rather, it points out the 
deep concerns regarding the contradictions raised by the questionable 
and decontextualized approach applied in the majority opinions in Sut-
ton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg. 
Part I of this Article provides a review of the Sutton, Murphy, and 
Kirkingburg decisions. Part II addresses the connections and conflicts 
between the Court's interpretation of the definition of "disability" and 
the legislative history of the ADA, agency interpretations, and prior 
cases. Part II also discusses the same conflicts concerning the Court's 
interpretation of the ADA's "regarded as" having a disability provision. 
Part III examines the Court's novel statutory construction in the trio of 
cases and compares it with generally applicable methods of statutory 
construction. Part III also analyzes the Court's approach in light of its 
previous decisions regarding deference to administrative agency inter-
pretations. Parts II and III demonstrate the apparently resultlpolicy-
oriented nature of the Court's approach. Finally, Part IV explores the 
(stating that EEOC regulations dictate that mitigating measures are not to be considered when 
determining disability). 
20. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
21. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. 
22. See supra notes 16-17. See also Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
23. These issues are discussed infra Part III. 
24. While the Court suggests flexibility in dicta, the holdings are rather broad. See, e.g., 
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149. The mitigating measures holding, combined with the other aspects of the 
Court's interpretation of the term "disability," will exclude many individuals who would have 
previously been considered disabled under the disability determination threshold. 
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options remaining for individuals who are no longer "disabled" under the 
Court's approach in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg. 
1. THE CASES 
This Part contains a brief overview of the Sutton, Murphy and 
Kirkingburg cases. A more thorough discussion of the issues and con-
cerns raised by those cases is contained in Parts II, III, and IV. The pur-
pose of this Section is to provide some context for the later parts of this 
Article by giving a synopsis of the majority opinion in each of the three 
cases, as well as introducing the apparent contradictions contained within 
each decision. 
A. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 
Of the three ADA cases decided on June 22, 1999, Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc. 25 may be the most significant because the other two cases 
rely heavily on it. 26 In Sutton, the majority decided that courts must con-
sider corrective and mitigating measures in disability determinations 
under the ADA.27 In doing so, it disregarded the holdings of the majority 
of circuits that have considered the issue,28 the long-standing interpreta-
tions of the three administrative agencies charged with implementing the 
ADA,29 and the bulk of the legislative history readily available (including 
specific language in both the House and Senate Committee Reports 
which clearly contradict the Court's findings).3o The Court also held that 
the petitioners in Sutton could not support their claim that the respondent 
airline "regarded" them as disabled in violation of the ADA.3! As will be 
discussed below, the holding on the "regarded as" claim may have far-
ther-reaching ramifications well beyond this set of facts. 
25. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139. 
26. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (1999). 
27. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146. 
28. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 
1998) (holding that self-accommodations cannot be considered when determining a disability), cert. 
granted and judgment vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2399 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 
626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that disabilities should be determined without reference to 
mitigating measures); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that 
plaintiff s diabetes should be considered without regard to whether his limitations were ameliorated 
through medication or other treatment); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 
933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (using the EEOC Interpretative Guidance to decide that mitigating 
measures will not be considered). 
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2155-56 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
30. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
31. Sutton, at 2149-52. 
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The petitioners in Sutton were twin sisters who applied to United Air 
Lines for positions as global pilots.32 Their applications were terminated 
when the airline realized they each had severe myopia resulting in uncor-
rected visual acuity of 20/200 or worse.33 Although they both functioned 
identically to individuals when wearing their prescription glasses, they 
did not meet the airline's minimum requirement of 20/100-uncorrected 
visual acuity.34 Petitioners filed suit under the ADA, alleging that they 
were disabled under 42 U.S.c. § 12102(2)(A), which defines "disability" 
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
... major life activities.,,35 Petitioners further alleged that the respondent 
airline impermissibly "regarded" them as disabled under 42 U.S.c. § 
12102(2)(C) because the airline found them unable to satisfy the re-
quirements of the job of global pilot even though their impairments were 
controlled with corrective devices.36 
The Court essentially used the disability claim in Sutton to redefine a 
major aspect of the definition of "disability" under the Act.3? According 
to the reasoning in Sutton, in making disability determinations courts 
must examine claims in light of any corrective or mitigating measures.38 
The Court based this aspect of its holding on three grounds. First, the 
Court noted that "the phrase 'substantially limits'" in the definition of 
disability is in the present indicative verb form.,,39 The Court concluded 
therefore that the language thus requires a person to be presently sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity, and that it is inappropriate to 
determine substantial limitation in regard to whether an impairment 
"'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating 
measures were not taken.,,40 According to the Court, "[a] person whose 
physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other meas-
ures does not have an impairment that presently 'substantially limits' a 
major life activity.,,4! 
Second, the Sutton Court determined that the definition of "disabil-
ity" requires courts to make disability determinations on an individual-
ized basis:2 Consequently, the Court concluded that making disability 
determinations based on an individual's level of impairment in an "un-
corrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the individualized 
32. See id. at 2143. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. 
35. Id. at 2143-44. 
36. Id. 
37.· Id. at 2146-47. 
38. See id. at 2146. 
39. Id. at 2146. 
40. Id. at 2146-47. 
41. Id. 
42. See id. at 2147 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2G) (1998)). 
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inquiry mandated by the ADA."43 As a corollary to the Court's view of 
the individualized analysis, the Court pointed out that in making disabil-
ity determinations based on an individual's impairment in an unmitigated 
state "courts and employers could not consider any negative side effects . 
. . resulting from the use of mitigating measures."44 The Court presuma-
bly believes that this new interpretation will be beneficial to the individ-
ual who will now be judged in her corrected state. 
Finally, the Court found that because congressional findings "en-
acted as part of the ADA" refer to "some 43,000,000 Americans" having 
one or more disabilities, Congress could not have intended the Act to 
require disability determinations to be made in regard to an individual's 
unmitigated state, because that would result in a number far greater than 
the 43,000,000 figure stated in the congressional findings:s The Court 
essentially ignored the legislative history directly relevant to the mitiga-
tion issue.46 
As will be explained in Parts II and III of this Article, each of these 
points is specious, and is directly contradicted by agency interpretations, 
legislative history, and numerous lower court interpretations. Ironically, 
the Court used these same arguments to hold that the Act is clear on its 
face, and that it is thus unnecessary to examine the legislative history or 
follow the agency interpretations.47 This is circular reasoning. The Court 
made numerous presumptions to support a disputed position it says is 
clear, and then used that alleged clarity to avoid referring to otherwise 
important sources that universally contradict the Court's presumptions:8 
Next, the Court applied its new approach to disability determinations 
to the life activity of working:9 Petitioners in Sutton based their claim on 
the major life activity of working, rather than that of seeing.so Basing 
43. [d. 
44. /d. 
45. /d. at 2147-49. 
46. See id. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
47. See id. at 2146-49. 
48. Justice Stevens' dissent powerfully drives home the discontinuity between the Court's 
conclusion and the numerous sources that canons of statutory construction suggest should be 
considered in this case, such as legislative history and agency interpretations. [d. at 2152-61 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also infra Part lILA (addressing the issues of statutory construction and 
deference to administrative agency guidelines in greater depth). 
49. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150-52. As will be seen, working is generally considered the "weak 
link" in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") definitions of life activities. 
50. See id. at 2150. Petitioners originally claimed a disability under the major life activity of 
seeing. The District Court held that while petitioners were impaired, the impairment did not substan-
tially limit them in the life activity of seeing. The court stated that petitioners did not actually claim 
any other restrictions for the life activity of seeing other than the ability to obtain the positions 
sought, although the court does cite petitioners' allegations that they are impaired in everyday ac-
tivities such as driving, etc. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., CIV.A.96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *3 
(D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996). 
The Tenth Circuit agreed that petitioners are impaired, but held that under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) 
of the ADA, whether such impairment rises to the level of a disability depends on whether 
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their claim on work limited the possibility of relief under the ADA be-
cause the EEOC guidelines themselves suggest that claimants resort to 
this activity only as a last resort, where no other viable claim exists.51 The 
Court appeared to latch onto this point to further limit the availability of 
a disability claim under subsection (A), at least where the claim is made 
under the "life activity" of working.52 The Court took advantage of the 
lower courts' dismissal of petitioners' claimed disability in the major life 
activity of seeing to avoid any in-depth analysis on this point.53 The result 
might have been different had the Court analyzed this argument, but Pe-
titioners' visual condition was still controlled with the use of correc-
tive/mitigating measures. Thus, adopting the Court's reasoning, the peti-
tioners would not likely have prevailed under subsection (A) even under 
the major life activity of seeing because the condition was mitigated. The 
Court's approach diminishes the chances of being found disabled under 
subsection (A) when one has a disorder that responds well to corrective 
devices, no matter what "life activity" would be affected but for the miti-
gating measure. The Court clearly implies this in its analysis of the indi-
vidualized nature of disability determinations.54 
The best potential recourse left if a "controlled" disability is no 
longer covered, would be to claim a violation of subsection (C), where 
the employer must erroneously "regard" the individual as disabled or 
regard the individual as still disabled despite the controlling measure. 
The Court limited claims under subsection (C) that are based on the life 
activity of "working" by holding that such claims must now be even 
more specifically drawn to show that the individual is substantially lim-
ited to "a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes" (and 
ironically used the EEOC guidelines for support).55 From now on, the 
applicant/worker will theoretically need to show an employer's unwill-
ingness to hire him/her to perform any positions the employer may have, 
even one which may be below the abilities and/or training of the appli-
cane6 A trained secretary with a controlled disability might be denied a 
petitioners are substantially limited in light of mitigating or corrective measures. Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 900 (10th Cir. 1997). The court held that petitioners' corrected vision 
did not limit them in the life activity of seeing, and rejected as an incorrect interpretation petitioners' 
reliance on the definition of "legal blindness" for purposes of Social Security disability benefits, 
holding that that definition contemplates corrected vision. Id. at 900-10. Yet the Supreme Court 
stated petitioners do not make the "obvious argument" that they are regarded as having a substantial 
limitation in the life activity of seeing, only that they are regarded as having a substantial limitation 
in the life activity of working. Sutton, at 2150. 
51. Sutton, at 2150-51. 
52. Id. at 2149-50. 
53. Id. at 2150. 
54. See id. at 2147. 
55. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-51. 
56. As will be seen in Part II this might give employers a way to thwart claims under 
subsection (C) regardless of the major life activity involved, because the employer can simply claim: 
"We did not regard plaintiff as impaired in major life activity X, but rather we only considered her 
impaired as to her specific job." 
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posItIon based on the employer's "regarding" her as still disabled in 
some way for that job, but if the employer believes she could perform a 
filing clerk's position it would seem the applicant might not be able to 
show discrimination under subsection (C).57 
The Court did not even address whether the employer actually needs 
to offer another position. The Court based its opinion in great part on the 
fact that petitioners would meet respondent airline's visual test for other, 
non-global, pilot positions, but made no mention of whether an employer 
must offer another position.58 Indeed, in another example of the Court's 
murkiness, on the issues, the Court declined to address whether United 
Air Lines acuity requirements for global pilots, which differ from those 
for other commercial pilots, has any relevance to the position and there-
fore to the airline's refusal to hire petitioners. As with the other two 
cases, the Supreme Court might have upheld the lower court's holding in 
Sutton on the basis that the petitioners were not qualified for the position 
even with corrective measures, assuming United Air Lines could justify 
those requirements. The Court, however, never reached this issue. 
As noted above, the Court held that whether a person is disabled is 
an individualized inquiry, which includes consideration of the positive or 
negative effects on the individual from the measures used to control the 
disability.59 At first blush this would seem a logical, perhaps even be-
nevolent, interpretation of the Act. However, the Court applies this rea-
soning, in all three cases, in a manner which would appear to penalize 
individuals who are able to control their disabilities at least to some ex-
tent, but who may be subject to unfounded stereotypes or need workplace 
accommodation to effectuate total, or even further, control. The Court, in 
trying to explain its position, uses a form of reasoning that ranges from 
unclear to outright confusing, and seldom comes close to legitimizing its 
holding. 
For example, in its analysis of the individualized nature of disability 
determinations, the Court states the following: 
For instance, under [the view that disability determinations should be 
made based on an individual's unmitigated state], courts would al-
most certainly find all diabetics to be disabled, because if they failed 
to monitor their blood sugar levels and administer insulin, they would 
almost certainly be substantially limited in one or more major life ac-
tivities. A diabetic whose illness does not impair his or her daily ac-
tivities would therefore be considered disabled simply because he or 
she has diabetes. Thus, the guidelines approach would create a system 
in which persons often must be treated as members of a group of peo-
57. /d. at 215l. 
58. See id. at 2150-5\. 
59. See id. at 2146-47. 
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pIe with similar impairments, rather than as individuals. This is con-
trary to both the letter and the spirit of the ADA.60 
129 
Prior to Sutton, in most jurisdictions, a diabetic would have met the defi-
nition of disabled; the level of control was used to determine whether she 
was a "qualified individual with a disability." Thus, poorly and well-
controlled individuals alike were protected from stereotype-based dis-
crimination. The Court's approach, however, essentially disadvantages 
the well-controlled individual by removing her from coverage, even if an 
employer discriminates based on unfounded perceptions or generaliza-
tions about the disability, and through its analysis of the "regarded as" 
clause the Court also limited the situations in which subsection (C) will 
be an effective alternative.6I The broader implications of this will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in Part II of this Article. 
First though, let us consider another all too plausible application of the 
Court's decision here, this time based on an application of subsection (C): 
Jason suffers from a moderate form of schizophrenia. He responds 
well to medication, and has held a number of low-level clerking posi-
tions, receiving positive references. He applied for the position of cus-
tomer service representative in a propane gas company, which pays an 
advertised rate of $8Ihour. The position would require Jason to deal with 
both new and present customers in person at the service counter as they 
come in to apply for service or inquire about problems with their ac-
counts. Jason would be responsible for taking the correct information 
from them, informing them of the company's services and policies, and 
referring any problems to the appropriate company personnel. The job 
description corresponds to those duties Jason has successfully fulfilled in 
the past. 
The hiring manager is aware of Jason's condition, and she is con-
cerned that Jason will not be able to handle the pressure of the service 
counter, which can become extremely busy during the winter months, 
with customers frequently angry over service problems. She offers Jason 
a position in the stock room instead, which pays minimum wage. 
Before Sutton, Jason would likely have been able to bring a claim 
showing: 1) that he is disabled under the ADA, because he has a disabil-
ity which substantially limits one or more life activities, including, but 
not necessarily limited to, that of working; and, 2) that the potential em-
ployer "regards" him as disabled despite the fact that he can show a work 
history which supports his ability to do the customer service job. Now, 
however, it is questionable whether he could do either. Under subsection 
(A), if his schizophrenia is controlled by medication, it is unlikely that a 
court would find him substantially limited in a major life activity at this 
60. Id. at 2147. 
61. Id. at 2158-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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time.62 He may also be unable to show discrimination based on subsection 
(C) because the employer found he could do another job in the "broad 
range" of the employer's jobs, albeit at a lower level of responsibility 
and pay. Although Jason has been precluded from a position based on 
nothing more than his disability, the Court's decision in Sutton and its 
progeny could well leave him without recourse. This is an all too likely 
result of the Court's murky approach. 
When you add to the mix the Court's justifications for disregarding 
settled administrative law, and the legislative history relevant here, one 
has to wonder whether Sutton will prove to be the Lopel3 of administra-
tive law, with the lower courts left never quite sure how, when, or if, 
Sutton applies. Whether the Court will acknowledge this and seek to 
clarify its holding--or whether Congress will do it for them-remains to 
be seen. The ramifications for administrative law will be discussed in 
Part III of this article. 
B. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 
In Murphy, the Court held that a mechanic with chronic and severe 
hypertension whose job required him to drive commercial vehicles was 
neither disabled nor "regarded as" disabled under the ADA.64 The me-
chanic erroneously received Department of Transportation ("DOT") 
health certification although he did not meet the requirements for those 
who drive commercial vehicles.65 In the time between the erroneous grant 
of certification and the discovery that he did not meet the certification 
requirements, Murphy apparently performed his job without incident. 66 
Upon discovering the error, however, United Parcel Service, Inc. 
("UPS") terminated Murphy's employment because he did not meet the 
DOT requirements.67 The Court primarily relied upon the reasoning from 
Sutton in holding that Murphy was not disabled for ADA purposes, but 
expanded on the Sutton reasoning in addressing the "regarded as" dis-
abled issue.6s 
Significantly, the case could have been decided on the "qualified in-
dividual with a disability" issue, particularly in light of the contempora-
62. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47. 
63. U.s. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (effectively reversing a half-century long trend of 
giving great deference to Congress in Commerce Clause cases by holding that the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority). Just as Lopez reversed a half-century 
long trend of giving great deference to Congress on Commerce Clause cases, Sutton effectively 
overturns years of precedent giving deference to administrative agency decisions-without actually 
saying so. We are left to wonder how the lower courts will deal with this implicit change. 
64. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2136 (1999). 
65. [d. 
66. [d. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 2137-38; See supra Part I.A. (summarizing the Sutton opinion). 
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neous decision in Kirkingburg ,69 but the Court eliminated Murphy's 
claim at the threshold issue of whether he was covered by the ADA at 
all. The reasoning used to reach this result involved presumptions and 
inconsistencies in logic that will be discussed in greater depth in Parts II 
and III. The remainder of this subsection will simply provide an over-
view of the decision in Murphy. 
In finding that Mr. Murphy was not disabled for ADA purposes, the 
Court explained that the holding in Sutton resolved the issue because 
"when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure does not substantially 
limit him in any major life activity.,,70 Thus, as the Court did in Sutton, 
the Murphy Court seemingly eliminated an entire class of individuals 
from ADA protection without ever reaching the question of whether such 
individuals are "qualified individuals with disabilities" or whether they 
need reasonable accommodation. 71 While this might be less troubling to 
some given the facts in Murphy, which involved DOT certification re-
quirements, the holding is not so limited.72 
Still, there is one significant limitation in the decision: 
Because the question whether petitioner is disabled when taking 
medication is not before us, we have no occasion here to consider 
whether petitioner is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite 
his medication. Instead, the question granted was limited to whether, 
under the ADA, the determination of whether an individual's im-
pairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities 
should be made without consideration of mitigating measures.73 
As will be discussed later in this Article, when considered in light of 
aspects of the Court's holding in Bragdon v. Abbott,74 this language could 
bring more individuals within the definition of "disability" under the 
ADA. 
Given the holding in Sutton, however, many individuals with treat-
able and well-controlled chronic hypertension, epilepsy, diabetes, myo-
pia, and other conditions, would not be covered under the ADA as a 
threshold matter. Thus, this limiting language from Murphy would not be 
helpful to Michele in the example above until the lights (and the failure 
to provide accommodation) actually caused her to have a seizure.75 
Moreover, that language would not be helpful to an individual with such 
well-mitigated conditions even where an employer acts on inaccurate 
69. See infra Part I.e. (summarizing the Kirkingburg opinion). 
70. Id. 
71. Compare Sutton. 119 S. Ct. at 2143 (holding that courts should make disability 
determinations with reference to mitigating measures) with Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136 (explaining 
that, with medication, petitioner is not substailtially limited in one or more major life activities). 
72. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137. 
73. Id.at2137. 
74. 524 U.S. 624,118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). 
75. See Sulton. 119 S. Ct. at 2146. 
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stereotypes regarding a disability, because such individuals are no longer 
considered disabled, and thus can not challenge discriminatory conduct 
unless they can support a claim that the employer "regarded" them as 
disabled or discriminated based on a record of disability. This is where 
Murphy becomes especially problematic, because it also limits the op-
portunity for individuals like Mr. Murphy and Michele to prove they are 
"regarded as" disabled by their employers, and thus limits the best alter-
native means for gaining coverage under the ADA.76 
In addressing the "regarded as" issue, the Murphy Court again relied 
on the reasoning from Sutton. Significantly, as did the petitioners in Sut-
ton, Mr. Murphy alleged that working was the major life activity in 
which he was limited.77 The Court held that in order to meet the "re-
garded as" element in an ADA claim, an employee must show that her 
employer regarded her as having an impairment that substantially limits a 
major life activity.78 If an employee alleges that an employer "regarded" 
her as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the em-
ployee must demonstrate that she was regarded as "being precluded from 
more than one job.,,79 The Court assumed, without holding, "that the 
EEOC regulations regarding a disability determination are valid."so Those 
guidelines (which were also a significant focus in Sutton) state that to be 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, an employee 
must be "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of 
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the aver-
age person having comparable training, skills and abilities."81 In addition, 
the Murphy majority states that courts should consider "the number and 
types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, 
within the geographical area reasonably accessible to the individual, 
from which the individual is also disqualified.,,82 
Applying this definition to Mr. Murphy's claim, the Supreme Court 
held that UPS simply regarded Mr. Murphy as "unable to meet the DOT 
regulations," and thus as precluded only from his particular job because 
he was able to perform other jobs that did not require him to drive com-
mercial vehicles.83 Thus, according to the Court, UPS did not preclude 
Mr. Murphy from working in a "class of jobs"; a requirement that a 
plaintiff must meet in order to establish that he or she is substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working. 84 This was fatal to Mr. Mur-
phy's "regarded as" claim, as it was to the claims in Sutton. Still, as in 
76. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137. 
77. /d. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. at 2138; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. 
80. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138. 
8!. [d. (quoting 29 C.P.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998». 
82. /d. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B) (1998)). 
83. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138-39. 
84. /d. at 2139. 
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Sutton, the Court only considered the major life activity of working. 
Therefore, it remains to be seen how the Court's approach would apply 
to a claim where another life activity is at issue. There are, however, two 
significant points to be made in this regard. 
First, while the Court has only considered the major life activity of 
working, and has acknowledged the unique hurdles a complainant must 
overcome to demonstrate an impairment in regard to that major life ac-
tivity, its holdings in Sutton and Murphy have ramifications for all claims 
based on the "regarded as" element (as well as claims based on the dis-
ability element). This is because in analyzing the "regarded as" claims in 
those cases, the Court required the complainant to demonstrate that the 
employer regarded him or her as substantially impaired in a specific 
major life activity or activities. s5 Thus, an employer who does not under-
stand a given impairment well enough to know what life activities might 
be affected, or an employer with an aversion or animus toward those 
with an impairment, could discriminate without "regarding" an employee 
or applicant as substantially limited in any major life activity other than 
working at the particular job the individual seeks or holds. As a result, 
unless an employer regards an employee's impairment as substantially lim-
iting in regard to a specific life activity or activities, the employer can dis-
criminate based merely on the perception that the employee cannot perform 
a particular job. That is exactly what occurred in Sutton and Murphy.s6 
Second, the Court's focus on working might actually limit its hold-
ing, and provide a means by which some employees with impairments 
that substantially limit another major life activity, but who are not so 
impaired with mitigating measures, can successfully bring a claim when 
their employers treat them as though they are so impaired. As noted 
above, the Sutton Court hinted that it might have responded differently to 
a claim based on the major life activity of seeing.s7 This possibility will 
be discussed in greater depth in Parts II and IV of this Article. As also 
discussed in those Parts, the Sutton plaintiffs would probably have lost at 
the next level of inquiry-whether they were qualified individuals with 
disabilities. That is the appropriate issue on which to consider these 
cases, but the Court eliminated the claims at the threshold issue of 
whether petitioners were covered under the ADA. For individuals like 
Michele, Jason, and Mr. Murphy, this approach could make it exceed-
ingly hard to ever get to the discrimination issue. 
C. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg 
Kirkingburg involved an employee who lost his job as a truck driver 
for Albertsons, Inc. because his visual acuity did not meet DOT require-
85. [d. at 2137; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50. 
86. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2139; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151-52. 
87. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150. 
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ments.B8 He suffered from a condition called amblyopia that resulted in 
20/200 vision in his left eye, which effectively left him with monocular 
vision.89 Significantly, the DOT had implemented a waiver program, and 
Mr. Kirkingburg ultimately received a waiver. Albertsons nevertheless 
refused to rehire him because the waiver program was experimental and 
Kirkingburg did not meet the basic DOT vision requirements absent the 
• 90 
waIver. 
The Court applied the reasoning from Sutton, and held that Mr. 
Kirkingburg was not disabled under 42 U.S.c. § 121D2(2)(At because 
he was not substantially limited in a major life activity given his innate 
ability to compensate for the poor vision in his impaired eye through 
natural adjustments.92 The majority reinforced the Sutton holding that 
courts should make disability determinations under the ADA on an indi-
vidualized basis in light of any mitigating measures.9J In determining that 
Mr. Kirkingburg was not disabled, the Court held that whether a miti-
gating measure is artificial, such as medication or prosthetics, or natu-
rally created, "consciously or not, with the body's own systems," is ir-
relevant to the importance of the mitigating measure in the disability 
determination.94 
Another significant aspect of the case arose from the definition of 
"significantly restricts" in the EEOC interpretation of the substantial 
limitation element of claims of disability under 42 U.S.c. § 
12102(2)(A).95 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that Mr. 
Kirkingburg's impairment substantially limited him in regard to the ma-
jor life activity of seeing, because Mr. Kirkingburg "demonstrated that 
'the manner in which he sees differs significantly from the manner in 
which most people see.' ,,96 The Supreme Court held, however, that this 
was an improper interpretation of the substantial limitation element as 
defined in the EEOC regulation relied upon by the Ninth Circuit."7 
The EEOC regulation defines "substantially limits" to require an im-
pairment to significantly restrict the manner in which an individual can 
perform a major life activity as compared to the manner in "which the 
average person in the general population can perform that same major 
life activity.,,98 The Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in equating 
88. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2165-66 (1999). 
89. [d. at 2164-66 (describing Mr. Kirkingburg's "monocular vision" as "an uncorrectable 
condition that leaves him with 20/200 vision in his left eye"). 
90. [d. at 2166. . ... 
9!. /d. at 2168-69. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 2169. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. at 2168. 
96. Id. at 2167 (quoting Kirkingburg v. Albertsons, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998». 
97. [d. at 2168. 
98. 29 C.F.R. § I 630.2Q)(ii) (1998). 
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"significant difference" with "significant restriction," because doing so 
improperly limited the ADA's "requirement that only impairments 
causing 'substantial limitations' in individuals' ability to perform major 
life activities constitute disabilities."99 Thus, as interpreted by the Court, a 
significant difference between the wayan impaired individual can per-
form a major life activity and the way most people can perform the same 
activity is not sufficient to establish a substantial limitation in that major 
life activity. 100 
The Court also held that the Ninth Circuit erred in not assessing Mr. 
Kirkingburg's disability on an individualized basis as outlined in the 
holding in Sutton. 101 Nevertheless, the Kirkingburg Court is arguably 
more generous in its interpretation of this issue. The Court stated: "While 
some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a 
major life activity we cannot say monocularity does."lo2 Although only 
dicta, this statement implies a less rigid approach concerning some im-
pairments which might be considered virtually per se disabilities. Given 
Justice O'Connor's opinions for the Court in Sutton and Murphy, how-
ever, it remains to be seen if this possible flexibility suggested in Justice 
Souter's opinion for the Kirkingburg Court will come to fruition. Still, 
almost immediately following this language, the opinion suggests that 
many monocular individuals will meet the definition of disability so long 
as they can prove that their impairment is substantially limiting. IO) Fur-
ther, the Court suggests that people with monocular vision will "ordinar-
ily" be considered disabled. I04 
This could prove significant because the Sutton and Murphy Courts 
addressed only the major life activity of working. This language implies 
that it may be substantially easier to satisfy the Court's new approach to 
disability determinations when a life activity other than working is al-
leged. Of course, even then, if mitigating measures make the impairment 
less than substantially limiting, as in Michele~s case, this language adds 
nothing. If this language were applied to claims based on being "re-
garded as" disabled, an issue not before the Court in Kirkingburg,105 it 
might be even more significant. As for Mr. Kirkingburg, the Court held 
he did not make the proper showing that the impairment was substan-
tially limiting in his case. IOO 
Ironically, the main issue in Kirkingburg was not whether Mr. Kirk-
ingburg was disabled, but whether he was a "qualified individual with a 
99. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2168. 
100. See id. 
101. Seeid.at2169. 
102. [d. (citation omitted). 
103. [d. 
104. [d. 
105. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2167 n.9. 
106. [d. at 2169. 
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disability," because he did not meet the DOT requirements. 'D7 It is quite 
interesting, in light of the treatment of the agency regulations in Sutton 
and Murphy, that the Court in Kirkingburg is quite deferential to the 
DOT regulations. 'Ds Nonetheless, there is nothing new or surprising about 
the holding that when an individual does not meet government safety 
requirements for a specific job, that individual is not qualified for the job. 
If, for example, the DOT required uncorrected visual acuity of at 
least 20/100 in each eye for commercial drivers with no exceptions, any-
one who did not meet that requirement would not be qualified to be a 
commercial driver. The employer could not accommodate the em-
ployee/applicant, because even if the employer believed there to be a safe 
accommodation, the employer would still be in violation of the govern-
ment regulation by allowing the person to drive a commercial vehicle."19 
The DOT waiver program made Kirkingburg a tougher case. 
The Court held that the employer need not hire a driver based on the 
fact that he or she could receive a waiver under the DOT's new program. 
It reasoned that the employer was entitled to rely on the clear mandate of 
the safety regulation, regardless of the availability of a waiver under an 
explicitly experimental program. 110 The waiver program, the Court stated, 
"did not rest on any final, factual conclusion that the waiver scheme 
would be conducive to public safety" to the same extent as the general 
visual acuity standards in the DOT regulation. II I Nor did the waiver pro-
gram modify the substance of the regulation; rather it "was simply an 
experiment with safety ... whose confirmation or refutation in practice 
would provide a factual basis for reconsidering the existing standards.""2 
Thus, it would be inappropriate to force Albertsons to hire Mr. Kirking-
burg simply because he received an experimental waiver of an otherwise 
binding safety regulation.1IJ 
This aspect of the case is less problematic for purposes of this Article 
because it is factually limited to cases involving government safety 
regulations."4 Moreover, as will be discussed in Part II of this Article, by 
addressing whether an employee or applicant is a "qualified individual 
with a disability," the Court is addressing the appropriate issues at the 
appropriate stage of the ADA analysis. It was in analyzing the threshold 
disability determination that the Kirkingburg Court, as well as the Sutton 
and Murphy Courts, erred by coming to a conclusion contrary to the leg-
107. Jd. at 2169-70. 
108. Jd. at 2169-70 n.l3; see infra Part m. 
109. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2171-72. 
110. Jd. at 2171-74. 
III. Jd. at 2173. 
112. Jd.at2174. 
113. Jd. 
114. See id. at 2070-74. 
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islative intent of the ADA,IIS the interpretations of the agencies charged 
with implementing the Act, and most of the courts that have analyzed the 
issue. "6 
II. LET'S PRETEND: AN INTERPRETIVE MORASS 
As the brief overview in Part I suggests, the three cases exhibit an 
almost surreal disregard for the legislative history, agency interpreta-
tions, and context of the ADA. Justice Stevens' dissent in Sutton does an 
excellent job of pointing this OUt." 7 Many of those involved in the proc-
ess of drafting, passing, interpreting, and enforcing the language in the 
ADA came to the exact opposite conclusion from that of the Court. 
Given that fact, the authors of this Article were somewhat stunned by the 
Court's holding that "by its terms, the ADA cannot be read" to allow 
courts to ignore mitigating measures in making their disability determi-
nations; thereby implying that the "plain meaning" of the Act dictated 
the outcomes in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg." 8 It would seem that 
what was "plain" to the Court was not so evident to the members of 
Congress who passed the ADA, the agencies charged by Congress to 
implement it, and most of the courts to consider the issue. 
A. Defining "Disability" Under the ADA 
The first point of concern arising from the Sutton, Murphy, and 
Kirkingburg cases arises from the definition of "disability" in the ADA. 
Specifically, it stems from whether courts should make disability deter-
minations with or without regard to mitigating measures such as medica-
tions and medical devices. As the above hypotheticals involving Michele 
and Jason demonstrate, the answer to this question can have significant 
ramifications for both employers and employees. 
The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being re-
garded as having such an impairment.,,119 The focus in this section will be 
on part (A) of the definition. As explained above, the Court held that in 
making disability determinations courts should consider the effects of 
any mitigating measures on the individual's impairment. '2o In Sutton, the 
Court essentially held that the plain meaning of the statutory language 
I 15. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
116. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
117. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissenting opinions of 
Justices Stevens and Breyer raise several of the concerns discussed in this Article.ld.; Id. at 2161-62 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
118. Id. at 2146-47. 
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). 
120. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145-46; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 
(1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162,2169 (1999). 
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supported this result. '21 As noted in Part I.A. of this Article, there were 
three primary bases for this conclusion: 1) the grammatical form of the 
phrase "substantially limits" requires that an impairment "presently" 
substantially limit an individual; 2) the statutory language refers to "indi-
viduals with disabilities," rather than undifferentiated disability catego-
ries; and, 3) legislative findings in the Act refer to 43,000,000 individuals 
with disabilities, yet if all persons impaired in a major life activity in 
their un-medicated state were included, a dramatically larger number of 
people would be within the Act's purview.'22 Ironically, the Court, which 
dismisses the need to explore the legislative history regarding the miti-
gating measures issue because of the supposed clarity of the statutory 
text, uses the legislative history to support its third basis for finding that 
text to be so clear.123 
If, as the Court suggests, these three bases really do mean that "by its 
terms, the ADA cannot be read" to allow courts to make disability de-
terminations without regard to mitigating measures,124 the Court's conclu-
sions on this issue would seem correct, perhaps even inescapable. Thus, a 
closer examination of the Court's bases for this conclusion is essential to 
determining whether the Act's language really does mandate the conclu-
sion the Court reaches. When examined, each of the Court's bases proves 
tenuous or specious. It is not that the Court's reasoning is not plausible 
under some reading of the Act, but that the Court's reading is not the 
only, or even the best, reading of the Act. 
As will be discussed further in Part III of this Article, under such cir-
cumstances the Court ordinarily looks beyond the text of the statute, to 
sources that may clarify the meaning of the statutory language. '25 How-
ever, in this case the Court cannot afford to do that because such sources 
confirm that the Court's interpretation of the statutory language is 
weak. 126 Thus, by pretending the statutory language mandates its conclu-
sion, and does not permit the alternative, the Court is able to avoid con-
sidering equally plausible alternative interpretations. 
1) The Present Indicative Verb Form 
The first basis for the Court's conclusion-that the grammatical form 
of the definition of disability requires that an impairment "presently" 
substantially limit an individual, and thus mandates consideration of 
mitigating measures-is not the most logical reading of the Act espe-
cially when its purpose, structure, and legislative history are 
121. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146. 
122. /d. at 2146-49. 
123. Id. at 2149. 
124. Id. at 2146. 
125. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text. 
126. See generally supra notes 16-20; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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considered. 127 The statutory language the Court relies upon here comes 
from 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(A), which defines a disability as "a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major 
life activities of [an] individual."'28 Based on this definition, the Court 
holds that: 
Because the phrase "substantially limits" appears in the Act in the 
present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read 
as requiring that a person be presently-not potentially or hypotheti-
cally-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability. A 
"disability" exists only where an impairment "substantially limits" a 
major life activity, not where it "might," "could," or "would" be sub-
stantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken. A person 
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or 
other measures does not have an impairment that presently "substan-
tially limits" a major life activity.129 
Yet there is no inconsistency between the statutory definition of dis-
ability and the making of disability determinations without regard to 
mitigating measures. The fact that Congress used the term "substantially 
limits" in the statute, rather than another form such as "substantially lim-
ited," does not support the Court's interpretation any more than it sup-
ports the opposite interpretation. A basic grammatical analysis demon-
strates this. Both of the following would seem perfectly appropriate: 1) a 
disability is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities" of an individual despite the use 
of mitigating measures (essentially the Court's view); 2) a disability is "a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities" of an individual without regard to mitigating 
measures (essentially the view expressed in the legislative history and 
administrative agency interpretations). 
The use of the present indicative verb form says nothing about 
whether courts should consider the individual in a mitigated or unmiti-
gated state. The implication of the Court's interpretation is that the verb 
form implies determinations should be made in regard to an individual's 
present condition, and therefore must refer to the mitigated state. 130 While 
even this presumption seems highly questionable as a structural maUer, it 
still does not support the Court's conclusion. An individual's disability 
could "presently" be evaluated in regard to his or her unmitigated state 
(in many instances a doctor could easily assess the person's condition in 
an unmitigated state and, in many cases, readily avaHable medical infor-
mation would make such an assessment obvious even to an untrained 
observer). After all, as the term would suggest, "mitigation" of the un-
127. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens. 1., dissenting). 
128. 42 U.S.c. § 12102(2)(A) (1994); See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146. 
129. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146. 
130. [d. 
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derlying condition (as opposed to curing) means that the underlying con-
dition still exists in a clinical state. The Court presumes that requiring an 
analysis of whether the person "might," "could," or "would," be disabled 
in an unmitigated state necessitates a hypothetical analysis that is incon-
sistent with the definition. 131 As the two grammatical examples above 
demonstrate the Court is hanging a heavy presumption on a very thin 
thread. 
Moreover, the Court's interpretation goes against an obvious struc-
tural interpretation based on the definition of "disability" as a whole. 
Subsection (B) of the definition specifically covers those who have a 
"record of ... an impairment" that substantially limits a major life activ-
ity or activities. '32 This is a specific acknowledgment that those whose 
impairment is not a "present" impairment, are covered by the Act. '33 Jus-
tice Stevens wrote in his dissent in Sutton: 
Subsection (B) of the definition, in fact, sheds a revelatory light on 
the question whether Congress was concerned only about the cor-
rected or mitigated status of a person's impairment. If the Court is 
correct that "[a] 'disability' exists only where" a person's "present" 
or "actual" condition is substantially impaired, there would be no rea-
son to include in the protected class those who were once disabled but 
who are now fully recovered. Subsection (B) of the Act's definition, 
however, plainly covers a person who previously had a serious hear-
ing impairment that has been completely cured. Still, if I correctly 
understand the Court's opinion, it holds that one who continues to 
wear a hearing aid that she has worn all her life might not be cov-
ered-fully cured impairments are covered, but merely treatable ones 
are not. The text of the Act surely does not require such a bizarre re-
sult. 
The three prongs of the statute, rather, are most plausibly read to-
gether not to inquire into whether a person is currently "functionally" 
limited in a major life activity, but only into the existence of an im-
pairment-present or past-that substantially limits, or did so limit, 
the individual before amelioration. This reading avoids the counter-
intuitive conclusion that the ADA's safeguards vanish when indi-
viduals make themselves more employable by ascertaining ways to 
overcome their physical or mental limitations. 134 
Moreover, subsection (B) of the definition uses the terminology "a rec-
ord of such an impairment."'35 The word "such" refers back to subsection 
(A) and its present indicative verb form, despite the fact that subsection 
(B) refers to past conditions (of course, the Court might respond that the 
131. [d. 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994); See Sutton at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994). 
134. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994). 
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record addressed in subsection (B) must by definition "presently" 
exist).136 Because the Court's interpretation is not the only possible inter-
pretation of the statutory language, the legislative history would be help-
ful in interpreting the term, and canons of statutory construction would 
support looking at that history here. J37 Of course, such analysis would 
suggest that the Court's interpretation is incorrect. 
2) The Individualized Approach 
The second basis for the Court's conclusion is quite important given 
the ADA's individualized approach and concern about disability-based 
stereotypes. There is a great deal of merit to the Court's approach of as-
sessing claims on an individualized basis. After all, no one should judge 
disabled individuals based on presumed traits associated with their dis-
ability. For example, it would be wrong to treat a well-controlled diabetic 
like a poorly controlled diabetic in most situations. Yet, as will be ex-
plained below, the Court's reasoning turns the purpose of this individu-
alized approach on its head by excluding from coverage well-controlled 
individuals and others whose impairments can be mitigated. 
Ironically, the structure and text of the Act make it unlikely that the 
Court's approach is in keeping with the ADA, and the legislative history 
confirms this.138 There is no question that the ADA requires consideration 
of mitigating measures to determine whether an individual is a "qualified 
individual with a disability," which is the next level of analysis in an 
ADA claim. 139 To be "qualified" under Title I of the ADA, an individual 
must be able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without 
reasonable accommodation. 140 At this level of analysis, mitigating meas-
ures such as medications and devices are clearly relevant because they go 
to whether an individual can perform the essential functions of the job 
and to what accommodation may be necessary, if any.141 In fact, this is 
the level of analysis where the Court's concept of the "individualized" 
approach under the ADA is most relevant. 142 
If, however, mitigating measures are considered in the initial dis-
ability determination the result is the removal from ADA coverage of 
disabled individuals who are capable of performing the essential func-
tions of their jobs with little or no accommodation. Such individuals may 
still be the victims of stereotyping and employment action based on such 
136. [d. 
137. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
138. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
139. See 42 U.S.c. § 12112 (1994). 
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). 
141. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the use of a 
hearing aid mitigated an impairment so that a person could perform essential job functions). 
142. Justice Stevens suggests exactly this point in his Sutton dissent. Sutton. 119 S. Ct. at 2156 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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stereotypes, evils Congress designed the Act to combat. 143 These indi-
viduals would thus be removed from coverage before they ever get a 
chance to prove they were victims of discrimination. This is exactly the 
consequence of the Sutton decision. l44 Moreover, individuals like Mich-
ele, from the hypothetical above, who are not disabled under the Court's 
definition, may need an accommodation to avoid problems related to 
their disabilities. Yet, under the Court's approach they are not entitled to 
accommodation because they is not disabled. 145 
The. Court presumed that an individualized assessment must be 
made in light of any mitigating measures. The Court reasoned that in an 
unmitigated state, the way one might respond to mitigating measures is 
unknown. 146 The Court also implied that many disabilities affect indi-
viduals identically in an unmitigated state; essentially bringing everyone 
with a particular disability, regardless of the mitigated level of impair-
ment, within the Act's coverage. 147 The legislative history and agency 
interpretations seem to indicate this is exactly what Congress intended by 
enacting the ADA. 148 
Of course, this makes perfect sense because it is equally clear that 
the analysis of whether someone is "qualified" will address the Court's 
concerns. In fact, an individual whose impairment is completely miti-
gated is unlikely to ask for an accommodation, because she can perform 
the essential functions of her job without accommodation. Consequently, 
this individual will most likely raise ADA claims when subjected to dis-
parate treatment or a hostile work environment based on her disability 
(or perceptions of that disability).149 There is no question that one of the 
purposes of the ADA is to prevent such stereotype based disparate treat-
ment,150 but the Court's approach effectively removes from ADA cover-
age many of those intended to be protected from such conduct. 151 Even a 
cursory examination of the legislative history and agency interpretations 
demonstrates that the ADA is meant to protect individuals against dispa-
rate treatment even if their disabilities can be successfully and effectively 
treated through mitigating measures, again rendering the Court's hold-
143. 42 V.S.C § 12101(a)(7) (1994); Burgdorf, supra note II at 436, 452. 
144. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146. 
145. /d. 
146. /d. at 2147. 
147. /d. 
148. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
149. Disparate treatment discrimination violates the ADA as it did the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 V.S.C § 794 (1994»; 42 V.S.C § 
12112 (1994). Hostile work environment is also actionable under the ADA, but raises some unique 
questions not raised under Title VII. See Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The 
Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action For Workplace Harassment Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1488-89 (1994). 
150. 42 V.S.C § 12101, 12112 (1994). 
151. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
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ings unsupportable. 152 The alternative means of bringing such individuals 
within the Act's protection, the "regarded as" disabled test, will be dis-
cussed in Parts II.B. and IV below. 
The majority opinions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg foster 
this problem by relying on the supposed clarity of the statutory 
language. ,s3 The claimed clarity enabled the Court to avoid analyzing and 
applying the legislative history and agency regulations. As was pointed 
out above, however, while it may be clear that courts must consider miti-
gating measures in regard to the "qualified" analysis, there is no basis to 
presume that even under the individualized approach of the ADA courts 
must consider such measures at the initial disability determination stage. 
It is just as consistent to consider whether an employee/applicant is "dis-
abled" in her un-medicated state-and then to consider whether she is "a 
qualified individual with a disability" based on his ability to perform the 
job in a medicated state. In fact, this is far more consistent with the Act's 
focus on remedying and preventing adverse employment decisions made 
on the basis of stereotypes. '54 It is hard to believe Congress intended the 
ADA to prec;lude discrimination rooted in stereotypes that have evolved 
based on the unmitigated characteristics of a given disability, and yet 
excluded from coverage those subjected to job actions based on such 
stereotypes if they are able to mitigate the impact of their impairment. 
When, as the authors of this Article suggest is the case here, the 
"plain language" of the statute does not "plainly" support an interpreta-
tion of that statute, courts, including the Supreme Court, often look to 
agency interpretations and legislative history for guidance on how best to 
interpret the law. ,s5 As Justice Stevens points out in his dissent in Sutton, 
neither the agency interpretations nor the legislative history support the 
Court's interpretation. ,s6 The EEOC, DOJ, and DOT-the three agencies 
charged with implementing the Act-have each issued guidelines that 
state that disability determinations are to be made without regard to miti-
gating measures.157 While agency guidelines do not bind the Court, they 
are generally given a great deal of deference, even when only one 
agency's interpretation is relevant to an issue. ISS In fact, the Court specifi-
cally stated this general rule in Bragdon v. Abbott, a recent case involv-
ing the public accommodation provisions of the ADA. '59 
152. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
153. Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2174 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-50 
(1999). 
154. 42 U.S.c. § 12101, 12112 (1994). 
155. See infra notes 207-18 and accompanying text. 
156. Sulton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153-56 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
157. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
158. See infra Part III (discussing deference to agency regulations). 
159. Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624,118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). 
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The Court avoided this issue by holding that none of the three agen-
cies is "empowered" to interpret the "definition" provisions of the 
ADA 16() The Court determined that Congress charged each agency only 
with enforcing specific titles of the Act; none of which includes the pro-
vision defining "disability.,,'61 Still, as Justice Breyer points out in his 
Sutton dissent, the term "disability" is used frequently in each of the titles, 
and thus the agency that interprets and enforces a specific title must be 
able to define "disability.,,'62 As all three agencies agree on the mitigation 
issue, their interpretations of this issue are, at a minimum, probative. '63 
Significantly, the agency interpretations had great support in the 
legislative history of the ADA Both the House and Senate committee 
reports reflect the fact that Congress intended courts to make disability 
determinations without regard to mitigating measures. l64 In fact, the clar-
ity of the legislative history and the unusually clear record of agreement 
in Congress on the meaning of a significant provision in a civil rights 
statute are surprising, given the Court's holdings in the three cases. 
Moreover, Congress intended that law developed under the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973,165 be used in interpreting claims under Title 1 of 
the ADA, where the provisions of the acts are consistent. '66 The definition 
of "handicap" (the Rehabilitation Act uses the term handicap instead of 
disability) under the Rehabilitation Act is almost identical to the defini-
tion of "disability" under the ADA '67 The Rehabilitation Act arguably 
protects individuals with impairments that can be mitigated by medica-
tion or other means. 168 Where the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and 
Title I of the ADA do not conflict, courts should apply the interpretation 
160. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144. 
161. [d. 
162. [d. at 2161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
163. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207. 
164. See supra note 17. 
165. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)). 
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994); See also Vande Zande v. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the decisions made 
regarding regulations of the EEOC under the Rehabilitation Act can be used to interpret the same 
terms under the ADA). 
167. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) with 29 U.S.c. § 706(8)(B) (1994). 
168. Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87,93 (D.C. 1997) (specifically holding that the 
Rehabilitation Act does protect individuals with impairments that are mitigated by medication and 
applying the EEOC interpretive guidelines for the ADA to a claim under the Rehabilitation Act); see 
also Strathie v. Dept. of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding a hearing impaired 
individual, who alleged his hearing impairment could be mitigated, to be a "handicapped person" 
under the Rehabilitation Act). Strathie actually demonstrates one of the potential problems with the 
Sutton analysis. Strathie had to allege his condition could be effectively mitigated in order to prove 
he was "qualified," and that he could be accommodated under state requirements for school bus 
drivers. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 231. Thus, the Third Circuit considered the mitigation issue at the 
logical stage of analysis, i.e., the "qualification" stage. /d. Under Sutton, Strathie might never have 
gotten to that issue, because his ability to mitigate might remove him from protection because he 
would not be considered disabled. 
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of the former to interpret the ADA.'69 Moreover, Congress was aware of 
the broad definition of "handicap" in the Rehabilitation Act when it used 
that definition as the template for the definition of "disability" under the 
ADA. l7o This is yet another indication that the Court erred in its interpre-
tation on the mitigation issue. 
It is also important to point out that most federal appellate courts to 
consider the issue prior to the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements, 
held that disability determinations should be made without regard to 
mitigating measures.17I While even a substantial number of lower court 
opinions do not bind the Supreme Court, when those interpretations are 
added to the agency interpretations, legislative history, and the law de-
veloped under the Rehabilitation Act, it becomes apparent that the Court 
erred. 
A corollary to the Court's "individualized" assessment analysis is 
the suggestion that allowing courts to make disability determinations 
without regard to mitigating measures would lead to "the anomalous 
result" that side effects of medications could not be considered in the 
disability determination. 172 This is a very weak argument: If an individual 
with a disability is taking medication, and the medication causes severe 
side effects, the underlying disability is likely to be substantially limiting 
without regard to the mitigating measures. If the side effects of the medi-
cation treating an impairment are more severe than the impairment itself, 
it is unlikely an individual would be prescribed such treatment. The 
Court might counter that a progressive or fatal disease that poses few 
outward limitations may be slowed or cured by a course of treatment that 
causes significant limitations in other major life activities. To the extent 
that such situations arise, Bragdon would seem to suggest that the un-
derlying condition would still be substantially limiting in regard to a 
major life activity(s).17J Moreover, as Justice Stevens points out in regard 
to the Court's analysis on this point: 
It seems safe to assume that most individuals who take medication 
that itself substantially limits a major life activity would be substan-
tially limited in some other way if they did not take the medication .. 
. . To the extent that certain people may be substantially limited only 
when taking "mitigating measures," it might fairly be said that just as 
contagiousness is symptomatic of a disability because an individual's 
'contagiousness and her physical impairment each [may result] from 
the same underlying condition, side effects are symptomatic of a dis-
169. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (c) (1998). 
170. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153, 2155 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
171. See supra note 19. 
172. SlItton,119S.Ct.at2147. 
173. See infra note 282 and accompanying text. 
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ability because side effects and a physical impainnent may flow from 
the same underlying condition.174 
Thus, this position adds little to the Court's assertion that "by its terms, 
the ADA cannot be read" to require disability determinations to be made 
based on an individual's impairment in an unmitigated state.175 
3) Legislative Findings 
Ironically, the Court attempts to strengthen its argument, that miti-
gating measures must be considered in disability determinations by re-
lying on the Act's legislative history which states that "some 43,000,000 
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this 
number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing 0Ider.,,176 If 
disability is determined without regard to mitigating measures, the num-
ber of individuals covered is likely to be much higher.177 This is the 
Court's third basis for its holding. The Court relied, at least in part, on 
the legislative history of the Act to find that Congress intended the ADA 
to cover the approximately 43,000,000 citizens cited in the reports. 178 If, 
as the Court asserts, the legislative history is not relevant to the mitiga-
tion issue due to the "plain language" of the statute, it would also be ir-
relevant to how many people were intended to be covered in light of 
mitigation. 179 In essence, the Court is utilizing legislative history on a 
tangential point to avoid the legislative history that directly contradicts 
its reading of that issue. 18o 
Without the legislative history used by the Court, we are left with 
the figure of 43,000,000 contained in the Act. 181 This figure is contained 
in a broad legislative findings section of the Act, and not in any specific 
provision. While the use of this figure in the Act would seem to support 
the Court's position, it is not a specific provision, and is a weak basis for 
countering all of the countervailing evidence outlined in this Article. 
Moreover, the language surrounding this figure-i.e., "is growing," 
demonstrates that Congress intended the number to be flexible. 182 Addi-
tionally, in deriving its interpretation based on the figure, the Court relies 
in part on an Article (and studies cited therein) written by Professor Rob-
ert Burgdorf, a key figure involved in drafting the ADA.183 As a general 
174. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2159 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
175. ld.at2146. 
176. 42 U.S.c. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). 
177. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-48. 
178. [d. 
179. This demonstrates the odd way in which the Court deals with the legislative history and 
agency interpretations in Sutton. See also infra notes 247-250 and accompanying text. 
180. Compare Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-48 with supra note 17. 
181. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-48. 
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). 
183. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. 
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matter, however, Professor Burgdorf's Article does not support the 
Court's interpretation, and in fact, implies quite the opposite result.'84 
It seems the Court is concerned that if it allows courts to make dis-
ability determinations without regard to mitigating measures there will 
be too many claims brought under the ADA.'85 If that were the case, 
Congress could amend the statute. '86 As the courts, including members of 
the Sutton, majority have pointed out in other decisions, that is not the 
Court's job. The Court should not use such tenuous reasoning to limit 
rights in a poorly reasoned manner because of a fear of too many law-
suits. In fact, the Court has interpreted other civil rights statutes to cover 
even larger segments of society. For example, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,s7 in effect covers every employee.'ss 
There is no reason to artificially limit who is covered under the 
ADA, especially because the determination of whether someone is a 
"qualified individual with a disability" resolves many of the cases about 
which the Court seems concerned. It is not the Court's role to erect artifi-
cial gates at the threshold of the ADA. Unfortunately, such a result-
oriented approach was inherent in the reasoning in Sutton and Murphy; 
and in Kirkingburg, to the extent it follows Sutton and Murphy. Still, 
despite the artificial limitations created by the Court, the "regarded as" 
element of the ADA's definition of "disability" would seem, at least at 
first glance, to provide an alternative means for many eliminated from 
coverage to remain protected under the Act. '89 As will be discussed in the 
next section, however, the Court significantly limits that option as well.'90 
B. Defining "Regarded As" Having An Impairment Under The ADA 
Despite the limitations wrought by the Court's analysis of the first 
element of the definition of "disability," the "regarded as" element might 
help some of those excluded from coverage under the Court's approach. 
The Court, however, placed considerable limitations on this element as 
well;'9' but, as will be discussed in Part IV, both the "regarded as" and the 
184. Burgdorf, supra note II. at 434-35 n.117, 445-49. 
185. Sutton. 119 S. Ct. at 2148, 2160 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
186. Of course. the fact that the Congress could do so does not mean it should or would do so. 
If separation of powers means anything, however, it is not for the Court to amend a statute that is 
within Congress' enumerated powers. 
187. 42 U.S.c. §2000e et seq. (1994); see also MacDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 
U.S. 273, 279 (1976) (applying Title VII to whites, despite Congressional focus on protecting blacks 
in passing Title VII). 
188. 42 U.S.c. § 2000(e)(2)(a) (1994); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2157-58 (Stevens, 1., dissenting); 
infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. 
189. See infra Part IV (evaluating the avenues that remain for people seeking coverage under 
the ADA). 
190. See infra Part IV (explaining that this element of the definition, although limited by these 
cases, may continue to provide several other avenues of coverage). 
191. See supra Part LA-C (analyzing the Court's holdings in Sutton, Murphy, and 
Kirkingburg). 
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"record of' elements may still provide coverage for some of the indi-
viduals excluded from coverage by the Court's interpretation of the first 
element of the ADA definition of disability. 
In Sutton, the Court began its discussion of the "regarded as" ele-
ment by explaining that "[t]here are two apparent ways in which indi-
viduals may fall within this statutory definition .... "192 First, an em-
ployer or other covered entity could "mistakenly" believe that an indi-
vidual has an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities. 193 Second, a covered entity could "mistakenly" believe "that an 
actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major 
life activities."194 It is the second point that may be of greatest use to 
those denied coverage under the first element of the ADA definition of 
"disability," because of the mitigated state of their impairments. The 
Court's broad explanation of the "regarded as" element is very much in 
keeping with prior interpretations of that provision.195 While this seems, 
at first glance, to be quite expansive, the Court later placed some signifi-
cant limitations on this provision. 
There are two key ways in which the Court limited the "regarded as" 
element in Sutton and Murphy. First, the Court examined whether an 
employer regards an'employee as substantially limited in a specific major 
life activity or activities. l96 Under this analysis, an employer who is igno-
rant about a particular disability, and therefore does not understand what 
major life activities might be affected, can simply stereotype an em-
ployee/applicant without regarding that employee/applicant as substan-
tially impaired in regard to any particular life activity. If the disability is 
mitigated when the employer learns of it, the employer may be less likely 
to recognize a substantial limitation on any particular major life activity. 
The employer simply may view some, or all, disabled individuals as gen-
erally impaired. It would be in keeping with the purpose of the Act to 
allow a disabled employee/applicant in this situation to bring a claim 
under the "regarded as" provision, because such stereotyping in em-
ployment decisions is a focus of the Act, and specifically of the "re-
garded as" provision. It is unclear how the Court's interpretation will 
affect such claims because the Court does not specifically address this 
issue. Of course, what motivates a given entity to discriminate-i.e., a 
general bias or one tied to a limitation on a specific life activity or activi-
ties-is going to be a question of proof in each case. 
The second limitation in the opinions is clearer, and perhaps' more 
troubling. That limitation relates to the specific major life activity at is-
192. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50. 
193. [d. 
194. [d. 
195. See, e.g .• 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1998). 
196. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138 (1999); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146. 
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sue in both cases-working. The Court is quite clear that in order to be 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be 
limited in regard to "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in 
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities."197 Therefore, the inability to perform a par-
ticular job, including the one sought by a complaining em-
ployee/applicant, is insufficient. 198 Interestingly, while not deciding on 
the validity of the EEOC regulations that it ignored in the mitigation 
context, the Court does rely on those regulations for this characterization 
of the life activity of working. 199 The Court's interpretation is in keeping 
with those guidelines, but it is contrary to the interpretation of Professor 
Burgdorf, whose article the Court relies on elsewhere in the opinion.2OO 
Burgdorf specifically states that the EEOC interpretation of this issue is 
not in keeping with the intent underlying the Act.,ol 
Significantly, the Court's analysis of the major life activity of work-
ing is relevant to the first element of the disability definition as well as to 
the "regarded as" element, but because of the way in which the Court 
decided the mitigating measures question, the "working" analysis is par-
ticularly troubling in the "regarded as" context. For example, if Jason, 
the schizophrenic employee from the hypothetical above, effectively 
mitigates his impairment through medication, and his employer never-
theless terminates him based on his "disability," he is not considered 
disabled. He might be "regarded as" disabled if the employer "regarded" 
him as disabled in reference to a specific major life activity, such as 
thinking or working, generally, but the employer can simply claim that 
he regarded Jason as impaired only with reference to doing his particular 
job and not to thinking or working in general. Under Sutton and Murphy 
the employer can presumably do so, as Jason is not disabled since he is 
able to mitigate the symptoms of his illness. 
As will be explained in Part IV, Kirkingburg explicitly, and Sutton 
implicitly, recognize that substantial limitations in life activities other 
than working might be easier to establish.202 For example, had the pilots 
in Sutton been allowed to assert "seeing" as the major life activity af-
fected, they may have had a very good argument on the "regarded as" 
issue.203 Working is essentially the life activity of last resort in ADA 
cases.204 Because, however, most disabilities affect, or may be "regarded 
197. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151 (citations ommitted). 
198. [d. 
199. [d. 
200. [d. at 2147. 
20 I. Burgdorf, supra note II, at 522 n.186. 
202. See Sutton, 119S.Ct.at2151;Kirkingburg, 119S.Ct.at2168. 
203. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152. That this would not have helped them under the statutory 
definition of disability because their condition was effectively mitigated. 42 U.S.c. § 12I02(2)(A) 
(1994) See note 50, supra, for a discussion of the lower court's reasoning on the life activity of 
seeing. 
204. See 29 C.F.R. § l630.2(j)(3)(i) (1999). 
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as" affecting major life activities other than working, the Court's "re-
garded as" analysis may have more impact on litigation tactics than re-
sults. Thus, a possible side benefit of the Court's analysis may be that 
claims that would have been based on the life activity of working, when 
other more, obvious activities could have been used, will now be brought 
based on those activities. Still, it is important to remember that in some 
cases working is the only activity an employee can prove is "substan-
tially" limited, and the Court's mitigation analysis may in fact make such 
cases more common. 
As noted above, the Court's analysis can lead to perverse results. For 
example, the employer in Sutton seems to have regarded the pilots as 
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, yet because the 
employer alleged that it only viewed them as limited in regard to work-
ing a particular job, the Court held they were not covered by the ADA 
(ironically, even if they had been, they may have failed the "qualified" 
test). Thus, if an employer alleges that it "regards" an employee as im-
paired with respect to that employee's particular job (rather than another 
life activity which may actually be the employer's focus), the employer 
may effectively remove the employee from ADA coverage. Perhaps this 
was not the Court's intent, and the employee might be able to prove oth-
erwise in some cases, but because in a "regarded as" claim the em-
ployer's perceptions are at issue, the employer may find it easy to defend 
its discriminatory actions. 
Finally, while a "regarded as" claim may provide an alternative for 
some individuals no longer considered disabled under the Court's analy-
sis, in many cases it will not help those disabled individuals thus re-
moved from coverage. For example, in the first hypothetical above, 
Michele is probably not "disabled" under the Court's approach, because 
her disability is effectively mitigated by medication. Moreover, when she 
is denied the reasonable accommodation she requests, she is not "re-
garded as" disabled, because the employer is simply denying her ac-
commodation, not taking action against her based on a perception of her 
disability. Thus, in order to be eligible for the small accommodation that 
would prevent her from having a seizure, she must have a seizure, so that 
she can meet the Court's definition of "disabled."205 If the employer later 
takes action against her based on a mistaken perception of her disability, 
she might then have a "regarded as" claim. This is significant because 
"regarded as" claims are most likely to be useful in cases of disparate 
treatment, but may not be terribly helpful when, as in Michele's case, an 
employee is denied a reasonable accommodation. The "regarded as" 
element will be discussed further in Part IV. 
205. But see Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (suggesting another 
possible argument to prove Michelle's disability in the hypothetical discussed throughout this 
paper). 
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III. MUDDYING THE WATERS: THE COURT'S DEVIATION FROM 
ACCEPTED METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND DEFERENCE 
TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY LAW 
In one fell swoop the Court has used these three cases, most notably 
Sutton, to deviate from accepted methods of statutory construction and 
precedent regarding deference to administrative agency interpretations. 
While the deviations were clearly necessary for the Court to justify 
reaching the conclusions it did, they raise questions for the future of 
both, with the possibility of consequences far removed from the particu-
lar arena of the ADA. 
A. The Nitty Gritty200 
It has long been held that in "all" cases of statutory construction, the 
Court must review the purposes promulgated by Congress, and interpret 
the words of statutes in light of those purposes.207 In the Act, Congress 
expressly stated that "the purpose of [the ADA is] to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.,,208 The ADA also expressly prohibits 
covered entities from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual 
with a disability because of the disability" in any of the terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment."" These words, clearly and ex-
pressly set out in the Act, would seem on their face to direct the Court's 
interpretation of the Act in relation to determining a disability. Until 
now, they arguably have. After Sutton, however, the definition of dis-
ability itself has changed.2lO While the Court may argue that it continues 
to follow the mandates of Congress, the change in definition and the di-
rection this Court has taken in the determination of disability, the inter-
pretation of "major life activity," and the "regarded as" clause lead to-
ward an approach different from that Congress suggests in the Act.. 
Statutory interpretation has always begun with an examination of 
three things, the result depending on what one finds in each. 211 Histori-
cally, courts have always examined first the "plain language" of the stat-
ute to determine if it speaks directly and clearly to the issue at hand.212 If 
206. This section is a basic explanation of general standards of statutory construction, as well as 
standards of review for Article III courts and administrative agencies. Although it is no doubt 
unnecessary to spend time on these for those familiar with the procedural aspects of court review, we 
felt that the far-reaching implications of these cases require us to provide some background for those 
who may be unfamiliar. This Article will also highlight the differences in the standards, and 
therefore the basic importance of the deviations made by the Sutton court. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 
2139. 
207. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153 (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 
600, 608 (1979)). 
208. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 12101(b)(I) (1994)). 
209. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 12112(a) (1994)). 
210. Id.at2139. 
211. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,489 (1917). 
212. See id. at 485. 
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it does, that is often the end of the examination because the court is able 
to determine Congress' purpose and intent directly. m 
If, however, the "plain language" of the statute is unclear, or if the 
court needs clarification of the language, a court will generally look to 
the legislative history of the statute.214 This will consist of all legislative 
parts that became part of the final bill.w Depending on the complexity of 
the statute and/or the overall enormity of the struggle to create it, this 
history may consist of a number of parts, including, but not limited to, 
the original bills from both Houses of Congress, the Committee Reports 
from each House, the Joint Committee Reports, any hearings which took 
place (including the testimony of witnesses), and, the words of the indi-
vidual Representatives and Senators themselves, all of which culminate 
to represent the intent of Congress.216 The court will generally use this 
cumulative history to shed light upon vague or missing language in the 
statute, or to bolster the plain meaning of the statute.217 (As will be dis-
cussed below, the Court in Sutton in fact used favorable legislative his-
tory to bolster its holding; however, much of the consternation about the 
case is that the Court refused to look at more relevant history.) Where a 
court finds that societal changes dictate a change in the current law, it 
may also examine the legislative history for support in promulgating a 
new policy.218 
This general statutory construction pertains to all statutes, whether 
they are subject to administrative agency interpretation or not. Courts 
may differ as to the actual meaning of the "plain language," which may 
not be so plain, after all. Similarly, courts may differ as to the meaning 
of, and reliance on, different parts of the legislative history. 
The real differences in statutory review relate more to where the case 
came from that what it says.219 Generally, courts review administrative 
agency decisions under a highly deferential standard.220 The Court has 
based this standard on the general purpose of administrative agencies: to 
provide a level of expertise not possessed by courts, in a less formal, 
costly, and time-consuming manner.221 Because these purposes would be 
nullified if courts were constantly second-guessing the expertise of the 
213. See id. 
214. See id. at 489. 
215. See id. at 489-90. 
216. See id. 
217. See id. 
218. See id. 
219. There are, of course, key differences in the way in which courts review decisions, 
depending on their origin. Decisions from Article III courts are reviewed under a range of standards, 
depending on the type of action under review and ranging from little to great deference to the lower 
court. However, administrative regulations generally carry a much higher standard of deference. See 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
220. See Chevron,467 U.S. at 843-44. 
221. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
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agencies, the Supreme Court has ruled that courts should only overturn 
agency decisions when they are clearly undeserving of such a high level 
of deference.222 
This Article will not attempt to discuss the appropriateness of the 
highly deferential standard of review afforded administrative agencies; 
that subject has been, and likely will continue to be, ripe for academic 
debate for years to come. 
Or maybe not. 
The standard of deference afforded administrative agency decisions 
is derived from (I) a number of cases dealing with the growing power of 
such agencies, (2) the Court's reluctance to insert itself into the adminis-
trative process, and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed 
by Congress to provide uniformity in administrative agency law.m Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe224 involved the authorization 
by the Secretary of Transportation of federal highway funds for con-
struction of a highway through a city park. In remanding, the Court held 
that it would not undertake a de novo review of the Secretary's decision, 
and that the Court, while making a "substantial inquiry" into the action, 
would nevertheless give the Secretary's decision the "presumption of 
regularity.,,225 Although Overton Park theoretically stands for greater 
review-ability of agency decisions in the absence of a specific statute 
precluding review,226 the Court also held that a court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency, but may only review the agency deci-
sion for reasonableness in light of a required record.227 Even while 
stressing greater review-ability for certain agency decisions, the case 
contributed to the higher standard of deference for agency decisions. 22M 
Two years later, in 1978, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit in Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., which had remanded a case involving the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, with respect to the licensing of nuclear reactors.229 The Court 
held that Congress had established the maximum rule making procedures 
it wished the courts to impose on federal agencies.Bo While the agencies 
themselves are free to add to those procedures in the exercise of their 
discretion, the courts may not impose additional procedures as long as 
222. See id. at 843-44. 
223. 5 U.S.c. § 551-59 (1994). 
224. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
225. OvertonPark,401 U.S.at415. 
226. RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 133 (1992). 
227. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. 
228. [d. at 413-14. 
229. See Vennont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
230. See id. at 557-58. 
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the agency has provided at least the statutory minimum, regardless of 
whether the court determines more would have been reasonable. 231 
While Overton Park and Vermont Yankee dealt with deference to the 
agency decision-making processes, in 1984 the Court spelled out the 
precise test to determine if and when a court may interfere at all in this 
process.232 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., the Court held that, with regard to judicial review of an agency's 
construction of the statute which it administers, if Congress has not di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue, "the question for the court 
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.,,233 
In application, this breaks down to a two-part test. First, did Con-
gress speak directly to the issue? In other words, is there plain language 
on the subject and is it clear?234 If so, the court's inquiry essentially ends, 
and the decision of the agency is deferred to so long as it followed the 
Congressional mandate. 235 However, if Congress was silent, vague, or 
ambiguous on the subject, the court must then examine the legislative 
history of the statute; but again only to determine if the agency's decision 
was based on a permissible construction.236 
Congress passed the AP A to achieve uniformity in the procedures of 
administrative agencies. The APA's provisions, generally read together 
with the case law, similarly require a reviewing court to set aside agency 
findings and conclusions only when the court finds that they may be "ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.,,237 The APA therefore, in words and practice, strengthens the 
deferential treatment accorded to agency decisions by the courts. 
Although a quite basic analysis of the recognized deference due ad-
ministrative agency law and interpretations, the above discussion illumi-
231. See id. 
232. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-
43 (1984). 
233. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
234. See id. at 842-43. 
235. See id. at 843-44. 
236. See id. See also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1990) (holding that the 
EEOC interpretation of the statute exceeded the deference allowed); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (establishing that where an agency was not authorized to promulgate rules 
or regulations concerning the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, the level of deference afforded "will 
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements. and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control."); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87 (D.C. 1997) (exemplifying that 
even where the agency is not authorized, the courts have used an alternative means to give deference 
to their interpretations). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145-46 (1999) 
(ignoring any alternative reasoning). 
237. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971) (citing 5 
U.S.c. § 706 (2)(A)-(D) (1994». 
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nates the Sutton Court's failure to follow even such basic guidelines. The 
Sutton Court offers little or no explanation for the deviation. 
B. New Rules, New Results 
At first, the Sutton Court appears to follow the Chevron analysis, 
laying out petitioners' argument that the ADA does not clearly address 
the definition of disability, and that therefore the Court should defer to 
the agency interpretations of the EEOC and the DOJ.2J8 The Court then 
discusses respondents' argument that the language of the ADA is clear, 
and that the agency guidelines conflict with it. The respondents contend-
edtherefore that the Court should merely look at the plain language and 
uphold respondents' argument; or in the alternative, if the language is 
indeed ambiguous, determine that the agency interpretations are still in-
accurate.239 The Sutton Court agrees with respondents that the agency 
interpretations clash with the plain language of the statute, and further 
that because Congress spoke clearly to the issue, there is no reason to 
even address the legislative history of the ADA.240 
The Court discusses at length just how and why the ADA spoke to 
the issue. The Court reads the three provisions of the ADA, which deal 
with the determination here, in concert. The Court holds that when read 
this way, it is clear that Congress "plainly" spoke to the issue.241 The 
Court reads the terms "disability" as defined in the ADA to be a mental 
or physical impairment which "substantially limits" one of the major life 
activities at present-not potentially or hypothetically.242 The Court relies 
on its conception of the "individualized basis" analysis at this initial 
stage to hold that persons should be judged in their corrected state, and 
found that any other analysis is contrary to this individualized approach 
mandated by the ADA.") The Court acknowledges that a person with a 
controlled disability still has an impairment, but holds that it does not, at 
least necessarily, at present "substantially limit" a major life activity.244 
One is faced with the curious question of just how (or if) the Court 
actually applied the Chevron test. As noted above, the Court determined 
that Congress spoke to the definition of "disability" in the ADA, reading 
the three parts in concert245 and thus determined that there was no reason 
to examine the legislative history of the Act."6 Yet the Court curiously 
does look to the legislative history to strengthen its view of the defini-
238. Sutton. 119 s. Ct. at 2146. 
239. See id. 
240. [d. at 2146. 
241. See id. 
242. See id. at 2149. 
243. See id. at 2147. 
244. See id. at 2149. 
245. See id. 
246. See id. at 2146. 
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tionallanguage and individualized approach of the Act.247 It relies on this 
history to assert that Congress never intended to cover persons with 
"controlled" disabilities, only those who have "substantial limitations" 
.now.248 In rejecting the very need to examine the bulk of the legislative 
history, which clearly contradicts its holding here, while using the small 
portion that nebulously supports it, the Court appears to be having its 
cake and eating it too. 
The legislative history, which the Court refuses to consider, deter-
mining instead that there is no need to do so because the "plain language' 
is clear, refutes much of the Court's reasoning here. While the Court 
focuses on subsections (A), dealing with the definition of disability, and 
(C), the "regarded as" section, the Court speaks little of subsection (B), 
which states that the term "disability," with respect to an individual, also 
takes into account "a record of such an impairment.,,249 (In his dissent, 
Justice Stevens argues that these words clearly indicate Congress' intent 
to cover persons with previous impairments, including those that may be 
totally controlled in the present.?50 
Another disturbing aspect of the Court's approach here is the ab-
sence of any reliance on its recent holding in Bragdon; or more specifi-
cally, on its adherence in Bragdon to the legislative history of the ADA 
in reaching its holding.251 While the subject matter in Bragdon is clearly 
different (involving an asymptomatic HIV patient), the Court, in holding 
that respondent's condition was a covered disability under the ADA, 
discussed the ADA's virtual adoption of the definition of "handicapped 
individual" in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as well as that in the Fair 
Housing Act Amendments of 1988.252 In discussing the almost verbatim 
lifting of language from those Acts to the definitional section of the 
ADA, the Court held "Congress' repetition of a well-established term 
carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in 
accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.',253 The Bragdon 
Court pointed out that Congress not only adopted the virtually identical 
definitions in the ADA, but further provided a specific statutory provi-
sion in the Act to ensure the construction of these terms in accordance 
with those of its predecessor Acts, instructing that "[e]xcept as otherwise 
247. See id. at 2147. 
248. See id. at 2f49. 
249. See id. at 2144 (Stevens, 1., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994)) (emphasis 
added). 
250. See id. 
251. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). 
252. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 631,118 S. Ct. at 2202 (1998) (citing 29 U.S.c. § 706(8)(B) (1994); 42 
U.S.c. § 3602(h)(I) (1994». 
253. See id. See also FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear COIp., 476 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1986); Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1965); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65, (1945) (dem-
onstrating the long-held and still valid analysis of statutory construction, an analysis which seems to 
be inexplicably missing in Sutton and its companion cases). 
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provided ... nothing in this [ADA] chapter shall be construed to apply a 
lesser standard than the standards applied under [the previous Acts].,,254 
As discussed below, the legislative history of the ADA discussed by the 
Sutton Court similarly makes clear Congress' intent that the Act cover 
those individuals both with a record of impairment and without consid-
eration of mitigating factors. 255 Yet the Sutton Court clearly, though inex-
plicably, repudiates some of the same legislative history it so clearly em-
braced in Bragdon, leaving only questions in its wake. 
Specifically, because the Court does look to at least parts of the leg-
islative history to bolster its new definition, it is even more confusing 
that it would ignore precedent on what history should be considered as 
well as the actual history available. Then-Justice Rehnquist stated in 
Garcia v. United States256 that "[i]n surveying legislative history we have 
repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legisla-
ture's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill .... "257 
The Committee Reports on the ADA are quite specific as to who 
should be covered under the bill, and contradict much of the Court's de-
cision here. The Senate Report states "whether a person has a disability 
should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating meas-
ures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.,,258 The report 
goes on to say in pertinent part: 
[an] important goal of the third prong of the [disability] definition is 
to ensure that persons with medical conditions that are under control, 
and that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not 
discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions .... 
Such denials are the result of negative attitudes and misinformation.259 
The House Committees adopted and appeared to strengthen the 
wording from the Senate, in that "[t]hey clarified that 'correctable' or 
'controllable' disabilities were covered in the first definitional prong as 
weI1.,,260 The House Report goes on to state that "[t]he impairment should 
be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as 
auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in less-than-
substantial limitation. ,,261 The House exemplified that statement by stat-
ing that the Act would cover persons such as those with hearing loss cor-
rected by hearing aids.262 
254. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 631,118 S. Ct. at 2202 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994)). 
255. See infra, notes 257-264. 
256. 469 U.S. 70 (1984). 
257. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 70). 
258. See Sutton 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 
(1989)). 
259. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (emphasis added). 
260. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24. 
261. See id. (emphasis added). 
262. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 29. 
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One of the clearest statements comes from the Report of the House 
Committee on Education and Labor, which states that the assessment of 
disability should be made "without regard to the availability of mitigat-
ing measures .... "263 This report goes on to state the following: 
For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited 
in the major life activity of hearing, even though the Loss may be cor-
rected through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with im-
pairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a 
major life activity are covered under the first prong of the definition 
of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by 
medication. 264 
These reports appear to specifically contradict the Sutton Court's 
conception of the first prong of the definitional test for disability as an 
individualized assessment that depends on whether the individual is 
functionally disabled at the present time. 
Further, the Court's acknowledgment that persons with controlled 
disabilities are still impaired, even though not presently so, is one of the 
incongruities of the Court's decision. The Court clearly stated that a per-
son with an impairment corrected by mitigating measures still has an 
impairment, the impairment however does not presently "substantially 
limit" a major life activity.265 Later, the Court acknowledged that Con-
gress, in passing the Act, was concerned that "society's accumulated 
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are 
the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."266 It goes on 
to explain that the "regarded as" prong was designed to cover individuals 
"rejected from a job because of the 'myths, fears and stereotypes' associ-
ated with disabilities."267 Yet the Court's holding here seemingly allows 
an employer to freely reject a worker because she has a controlled dis-
ability which does not now rise to the level of substantial impairment of 
a life activity, but who would need accommodation for the job to con-
tinue in a controlled state. 
While the Court would argue that technically the employer is not 
being given free reign to discriminate in this fashion, the unfortunate 
result is likely to be just that. The rejected applicant, like Michele, can no 
longer claim discrimination under the Court's approach to subsection (A) 
because her disability is controlled by mitigating measures, and thus does 
not "substantially limit" her in a life activity right now. Neither can she 
claim discrimination under subsection (C), as the Court seems to leave 
263. See id. 
264. See id. (emphasis added). 
265. See Sutton. 119 S. Ct. at 2149. 
266. See id. at 2150. 
267. See id. 
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open,268 for the employer may not "regard her as" disabled in her con-
trolled state. In practice, the employer is now free to reject an applicant, 
because of impairment, whom she would previously had to consider 
without her regard to impairment. Even an applicant like Jason, who an 
employer may "regard as" disabled even though his disability is con-
trolled, may not have redress if he is offered a lower paying position in 
the "broad range of jobs." Justice Stevens points out in his dissent that 
the ADA was enacted in great part to address just this issue: applicants, 
such as Michele and Jason, are not generally "substantially limited" in 
their mitigated condition, yet employers stereotype applicants on as-
sumptions "not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individu-
als to participate in, and contribute to, society.,,269 For applicants with 
certain physical disabilities, particularly those dealing with mobility, 
subsection (A) would appear easier to hurdle, because there is obviously 
still a "substantial limitation" on most major life activities. But for those 
like Michele or Jason, or the petitioners in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirking-
burg, the claim is far more difficult, and may result in true inequities. 
Moreover, the dissent in Sutton points out that the Court has con-
sistently interpreted statutes dealing with discrimination broadly, even 
when the class of individuals was beyond Congress' concern at the time 
of passage.270 When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, its aim was to protect African-Americans.271 Yet the Court placed 
great reliance on legislative history and accorded "great deference" to the 
EEOC's interpretations of the Act to extend it to other groups, including 
Caucasians.272 Thus the Court's interpretation here is not only unprece-
dented, it is actually opposite not only to its previous decisions but also 
its earlier reasoning. 
In fact, if the Court had agreed with all the entities which have pre-
viously interpreted the Act, and looked to the entirety of the legislative 
history to determine if the agency's interpretation was a permlssible con-
struction of the statute, the outcome clearly could have been quite differ-
ent here. The bulk of the legislative history (possibly aside from, or even 
despite, the very specific portion cited by the Court in its opinion), would 
likely support the agency's interpretation as permissible. The Bragdon 
Court relied on just such a "uniform body" of judicial and administrative 
precedent in reaching its holding. 273 The Bragdon Court held that uni-
formity of precedent was "significant," finding that "[ w ]hen administra-
tive and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing 
statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indi-
cates, as a general matter, [Congress'] intent to incorporate [such] inter-
268. See id. 
269. See id. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
270. Seeidat2157. 
271. See id. 
272. See id. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976)). 
273. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2208. 
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pretations as well.,,274 Relying on this history to find a protected designa-
tion would not even have necessarily given petitioners a victory, how-
ever. As noted earlier, each of these cases could have, and very probably 
would have, been upheld as applied against each of the petitioners based 
on the specific qualifications needed for each of the positions, which 
petitioners in each case were still not likely to meet. The Court, however, 
appears to have chosen to use these cases instead to ignore years of· 
precedent and invalidate the statute for whole classes of people. 
Another question that arises from Suiton and its instant progeny is 
whether then, the Court has signaled a change in the tests and/or levels of 
deference due administrative agency decisions. While it might be argued 
that that would not necessarily be a bad thing, the application to these 
cases shows that there is logic in the "presumption of regularity" given to 
agency decisions, based on their presumed expertise and experience in 
the subject areas.275 No matter the original intention here, whether to 
weaken the application of the ADA, or to affect the wholesale levels of 
deference due administrative agencies in general, the holdings here may 
well result in both. 
One of the justifications used by the Court to withhold deference to 
the three administrative agencies charged with implementing the Act is 
that none of the agencies was specifically charged by Congress with the 
authority to interpret the term "disability," and therefore, none is owed 
deference in interpretation.276 This, again, is somewhat contradicted in the 
Court's earlier holding in Bragdon.277 The Bragdon Court, in discussing 
its reliance on the guidance of the DOl and other agencies charged with 
administering the ADA, held that the views of agencies charged with 
implementing a statute "are entitled to deference.,,278 Bragdon follows a 
line of cases with similar procedural holdings.279 Clearly, Congress gave 
none of the agencies involved there the direct authority to define the 
terms under the ADA any more than they did here. Yet the Court in 
Bragdon spoke of the agencies' responsibilities in implementing the Act, 
presumably requiring the same determination of terms as was done here, 
as entitling them to the deference due under Chevron and its progeny. 280 
Most telling perhaps, is that the Bragdon Court specifically cited to 
Chevron in arriving at these conclusions; a significant omission in Sut-
ton, and one which, as seen, triggers basic procedural questions about the 
case. 
274. See id. (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978). 
275. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). 
276. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145-46. 
277. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 645,118 S. Ct. 2196, 2208 (1998). 
278. See id. at 2209 (citing Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984)). 
279. See. e.g., Skidmore v. Swift and Co .. 323 U.S. 134, 138-40 (1944). 
280. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 646, 118 S. Ct. at 2209 (citing Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense 
Council, 467 U.S 837, 844 (1984)). 
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There appears to be a clear conflict between the procedural posture 
adopted only a year before in Bragdon and that adopted in Sutton. Fur-
ther, it is a conflict without a clear resolution; one that is likely to leave 
the lower courts in confusion over whether Sutton is, indeed, a new di-
rection, or whether the lack of reference to Bragdon is a procedural door 
left ajar for applicants. (As noted in Section IV below, Bragdon may also 
contain a substantive door to slip through.) It would not be surprising, 
perhaps, to see a new split in the circuits over the use and applicability of 
Bragdon in the post-Sutton application of the ADA. 
While the Court surely clouds the application of the traditional def-
erence tests to administrative agencies here, and arguably misapplies 
them, it never actually acknowledges a change in the test. This alone may 
well leave the lower courts without guidance, and injured employees 
without recourse, in an already highly litigated area of law. 
IV. A VOIDING THE POTENTIALLY HARSH RESULTS OF SU1TON AND 
MURPHY 
The Supreme Court's recent cases may be the death knell for many 
ADA claims brought by individuals with impairments effectively treated 
with medication or other means. Yet several avenues remain for such 
individuals to be covered by the ADA. First, as noted in Part LA. of this 
Article, the Sutton Court left open the possibility that if a mitigating 
measure itself causes a substantial limitation on a major life activity, the 
individual is disabled.2l!' For example, if an individual has high blood 
pressure or epilepsy, and is able to mitigate the effects of the impairment 
through medication, but the medication itself causes severe side effects 
that substantially limit the individual in performing a major life activity, 
that individual is "disabled" under the Court's analysis. Of course, under 
the Court's analysis, even if the mitigating measure has no side effects, if 
it does not mitigate the effect of the impairment sufficiently to prevent a 
substantial limitation on a major life activity, the individual would be 
disabled. 
Significantly, in Bragdon, the Court recognized that asymptomatic 
HIV infection is a disability. Specifically, it found that despite the lack of 
significant outward symptoms at this stage of the disease, HIV easily 
meets the definition of disability because it is an impairment that sub-
stantially limits an infected individual in a number of major life activities 
(the one specifically alleged and addressed in that case was reproduc-
tion).282 Thus, the Court has recently held that an outwardly asympto-
matic impairment can be a disability if it still affects the body's systems 
in a manner that places a substantial limitation on a major life activity or 
281. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-47 (1999). 
282. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 643, 118 S. Ct. at 2207. As explained in Part III, supra, Bragdon also 
might limit some troubling aspects of the Sulton Court's procedural holdings. 
HeinOnline -- 77 Denv. U. L. Rev. 162 1999-2000
162 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
activities.283 Thus, while there is a huge difference between epilepsy and 
illV, and between the effectiveness of mitigating measures in regard to the 
two diseases-Michele from the earlier hypothetical could argue that de-
spite the fact she is asymptomatic due to medication, since certain types of 
flashing lights could still cause her to have a seizure, she does "presently" 
have an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 
One problem with this argument, however, is the language from 
Sutton, suggesting that a well-controlled diabetic would not necessarily 
be disabled; a situation similar to Michele's.284 In both cases the individ-
ual is well controlled, is no different from anyone else in most ways, and 
will only have a problem if exposed to certain situations or substances 
(flashing lights, deprivation of food, or excessive sugar). Therefore, in 
both cases, one might argue based on Bragdon, that the individual has an 
impairment that affects a major life activity or activities, but whether the 
condition places a substantial limitation is called into question by 
Sutton. 285 Bragdon implies that HIV infection is a per se disability.286 
Whether after Sutton other impairments might, as the Kirkingburg Court 
suggests with regard to amblyopia, "ordinarily" meet the ADA's defini-
tion of disability, (and if so, which ones?) remain open question.287 
Moreover, while the Court significantly limited the "regarded as" 
element in connection with the major life activity of working, Kirking-
burg suggests that other life activities can still provide a basis for a find-
ing of disability.2g8 While this may not be terribly helpful in regard to the 
first element of the disability definition (the element discussed in Kirk-
ingburg) for those whose conditions are effectively mitigated, it may 
prove very useful in the "regarded as" context. If an individual can dem-
onstrate that despite mitigation, he or she is regarded as substantially 
limited in a major life activity such as seeing, hearing, walking, etc. The 
ADA would apply. Thus, if the employer acts based on a mistaken per-
ception of an individual's disability, the individual would be covered 
under the "regarded as" provision. Of course, because this relates only to 
the threshold issue of whether the individual is protected under the ADA, 
the individual must still prove that he is a "qualified individual with a 
disability" and meet any other requirements under the Act for proving his 
claim. 
Another possible avenue left open by the Court is the "record of' an 
impairment element, which is not directly addressed in any of the three 
opinions. If an individual with a currently mitigated disability has a rec-
ord of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, such 
283. Id. at 629-35. 
284. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. 
285. Id. at 2146. 
286. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 635-36,118 S. Ct. at 2204. 
287. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2169. 
288. Id. 
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as a record of the disability in its unmitigated state or from a time when 
the mitigating measures did not mitigate the effects of the disability as 
well, that individual could be covered. Of course, one would need to 
demonstrate that a record exists, and that the employer relied on that 
record.289 Because such records may provide an easy basis for misjudging 
a disabled employee's abilities regardless of mitigating measures, an 
individual who has such a record could avoid the concerns created by the 
Supreme Court's analysis by basing her claim on having a record of an 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or activities.290 
But again, this claim only helps an employee if such a record existed and 
was relied upon by the employer. 
Given the possibilities set forth in this section, it is essential for 
those representing disabled individuals in ADA claims to understand 
what the Court's recent decisions do and do not permit. In this regard, it 
is important that courts applying the ADA remember that despite the 
Court's decisions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg, some individuals 
with effectively mitigated impairments may still be covered under the 
ADA. While the Court's analysis makes it much harder for individuals 
with mitigated disabilities to be protected by the ADA, with the proper 
proof, many such employees may remain covered for the reasons set 
forth in this Part. 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of what one thinks of the results in these cases, the Su-
preme Court's seemingly result-oriented approach appears questionable 
given the fact that it goes against Congress' intent as embodied in the 
ADA's legislative history, the interpretations of all three agencies 
charged with implementing the Act, the decisions of most courts to ad-
dress the issues involved, and the language and structure of the Act as 
reflected in alternative textual interpretations. The Court seems afraid 
that too many people will be protected under the ADA, and that employ-
ers will suffer as a result. This is very troubling because that is a decision 
for Congress to make, and Congress has spoken on that issue through the 
Act and its legislative history. Perhaps after these cases, Congress will 
more directly speak on the issue to correct what appears to go against its 
intent, as it did in regard to several cases interpreting Title VII through 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
What is perhaps most troubling about these cases is that most of the 
Court's concerns are already dealt with through the "qualified individual 
with a disability" requirement. Thus, there is little risk of unqualified 
commercial drivers or pilots taking to the roads or skies with the protec-
tion of the ADA. To the extent that such situations are possible, strength-
ening the application of the "qualified" .element would be a method of 
289. 29 CER. pI. 1630 app. § 1 630.2(k) (1999). 
290. See id. 
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addressing such concerns that is far more consistent with the ADA's 
underlying purpose and structure. As a result of these decisions many 
employees who are qualified with mitigating measures, will be kept from 
ever proving they are qualified or that they were discriminated against 
based on their disabilities, because they are removed from coverage un-
der the Act. This might lower the number of questionable claims that 
make it past the initial pleadings stage (an arguably positive result), but it 
does so at the expense of the rights of many disabled individuals who 
have been discriminated against on the basis of disability, but who are no 
longer protected under the Act. This is a classic case of "throwing the 
baby out with the bath-water," and to make matters worse, in this case 
the Court used the wrong window. 
